We study the impact on investment decisions of a democratic decision-making process in a firm and of its transmission across generations of agents. Democratic decision-making can exist both with workers (in the labour-managed firm with one worker = one vote) and with shareholders (in joint-stock companies with one share = one vote). The decision is taken by a number of agents who may have differences of opinion. This heterogeneity is associated in the literature (e.g. Hansmann 1996) with inefficiency. Our research's aim is to study the deep mechanisms of the inefficiency and to show if and when it can be avoided.

« Would workplace democracy invest less than capitalism hierarchy? »

2018: 19th International Association For the Economics of Participation (IAFEP) conference, University of Ljubljana

2017: 10th International Critical Management Studies (CMS) conference, Edge Hill University, Liverpool; LEM research seminar, Université de Lille

« Would workplace democracy invest less than capitalism hierarchy? »

2018 Horvat-Vanek prize for a research paper of exceptional quality written by a young scholar at the 19th IAFEP Conference ( http://www.iafep.org/ )

« Impact of profit-sharing and/or worker management on productivity. Evidence from France »

2018: 19th International Association For the Economics of Participation (IAFEP) conference, University of Ljubljana; LEM research seminar, Université de Lille

« To cooperate or to collect ? » with Dr. Médédé Tchakpalla

2019: LEM research seminar, Université de Lille

« Comparative study of the impact of profit-sharing ("intéressement" and "participation") and labour-management on french firms performance »

Three year access to data from INSEE, DARES, DGFIP granted by CASD-GENES and the statistical secret comity (scientific supervisor)

One year grant (renewable) from the Lille University Data Platform (PUDL) and the European House for Social Studies (MESHS) (MESHS) (scientific supervisor)